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abstract: The supervenience argument against non-reductive moral realism
threatens to rule out the existence of irreducibly normative properties by estab-
lishing that for every normative property there is a corresponding non-normative
property that is necessarily co-extensive with it. This paper ﬁrst considers but re-
jects the suggestion that one can address the supervenience argument by insisting
that normative properties only supervene with normative but not metaphysical
necessity. It then establishes that the standard response to the supervenience ar-
gument, which consists in rejecting necessary co-extension as the criterion for
property identity, does not suﬃce for defending non-reductionist views of the
normative. In particular, it identiﬁes a hyperintensional analogue of the superve-
nience argument that threatens non-reductionism even within a hyperintensional
setting. This grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism threatens
to rule out the existence of irreducibly normative properties by establishing that
for every normative property there is a corresponding non-normative property
that has the very same grounds and is, accordingly, hyperintensionally equiva-
lent. It is then argued that non-reductionism can nevertheless be salvaged by
distinguishing the diﬀerent grounding relations that are involved in grounding
the normative property and the corresponding non-normative property. Non-
reductionist versions of moral realism thus turn out to be committed to there
being irreducibly diﬀerent grounding relations.

 The supervenience argument
Strong supervenience of normative properties on non-normative properties im-
plies that for every normative property there is a necessarily co-extensive non-
normative property, given that the set of non-normative properties is closed un-
der inﬁnitary disjunction and conjunction (cf. Kim: , chapter ; Jackson:
; Streumer: ).; This puts pressure on non-reductionist versions of
moral realism, insofar as normative properties would seem to end up being iden-
tical to non-normative properties, thereby ruling out the existence of irreducibly
normative properties.;
. normative properties strongly supervene on non-normative properties
. the set of non-normative properties is closed under inﬁnitary
disjunction and conjunction
) for every normative property there is an intensionally equivalent non-
normative property
. intensionally equivalent properties are identical
) every normative property is identical to a non-normative property
 Normative supervenience
Premise  can be construed in two ways, namely as positing either a normative
or a metaphysical supervenience relation.
-norm: ‘normative properties strongly supervene with normative necessity on
non-normative properties’.
-meta: ‘normative properties strongly supervene with metaphysical necessity on
non-normative properties’.
Kim’s proof appealed to B-maximal properties that presuppose inﬁnitary Boolean closure,
which is problematic since closure under complementation is implausible for the set of non-
normative properties and cannot be assumed without begging the question against the proponent
of irreducibly normative properties. Yet, van Cleve showed that Kim’s result can be established by
means of fewer resources. Since we only need to appeal to B-natures and not to B-maximal prop-
erties, closure under inﬁnitary disjunction and conjunction is suﬃcient (cf. van Cleve: ).
When concerned with the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, one is
primarily concerned with the instantiation of normative properties (e.g. a particular value bearer,
say action a, instantiates the normative property of being good), i.e. with particular facts rather
than with general facts such as -ing is good.
As Streumer has pointed out, this terminology may be somewhat confusing, given that a
reductionist view will be categorised as one identifying normative properties with non-normative
properties (cf. Streumer: , p. ). Non-normative properties are thus to be understood
not negatively as not being normative properties, but positively as being descriptive properties.
Analogous arguments can be run against irreducibly normative facts or truths.

Defenders of irreducibly normative properties can challenge the supervenience
argument on the basis that -meta is required for the argument to succeed but
that only the weaker -norm is warranted.
If normative properties only normatively supervene on non-normative prop-
erties, such that the supervenience claim only holds with normative but not meta-
physical necessity, then normative properties will only be necessarily co-extensive
with their non-normative counterparts when it comes to normative modality. For
each normative property there will be a non-normative property that has the same
extension in all normatively possible worlds. This, however, does not suﬃce to
establish the conclusion that normative properties are identical to non-normative
properties. Metaphysical necessity is required if necessarily co-extensive proper-
ties are to be identical, given that the identity and distinctness of properties is a
metaphysical matter.
When only accepting -norm, the relation between normative and non-
normative properties is analogous to that between dispositional and categorical
properties (for those rejecting dispositional essentialism). Dispositional proper-
ties strongly supervene on categorical properties. Strong supervenience implies
the possibility of constructing for every dispositional property a necessarily co-
extensive disjunctive property formed out of categorical properties by suitably
conjoining and disjoining the categorical properties that form the supervenience
bases of dispositional properties. Since categorical properties satisfy the relevant
closure conditions, insofar as a disjunction of conjunctions of categorical prop-
erties is itself a categorical property, it would seem that one ends up being com-
mitted to dispositional properties being identical to categorical properties.
This conclusion, however, is misguided since identity requires (at a mini-
mum) necessary co-extensiveness across all metaphysically possible worlds. The
supervenience of dispositional on categorical properties, however, only holds with
nomological necessity. The same categorical properties can give rise to diﬀerent
dispositions if the causal laws are diﬀerent, such that a duplicate of a fragile object
in a world with diﬀerent laws need not also be fragile. The laws make a diﬀerence
and thereby ensure that the supervenience claim involves the wrong modality for
establishing reductionist conclusions.
By insisting on a normative rather than metaphysical supervenience claim,
one would thus seem to be able to defend the irreducibility of normative prop-
erties in a manner that is analogous to how dispositional properties turn out to
be distinct from and not reducible to categorical properties, given that they only
supervene nomologically but not metaphysically.
Streumer has claimed that defending irreducibly normative properties by ap-
pealing to normative supervenience implies the objectionable commitment that
“it is possible for an object to gain an additional normative property without this
object or any other object gaining any additional descriptive property” (Streumer:
, p. ). Merely having normative but not metaphysical supervenience

would, in this way, seem to allow for objectionably brute and unexplained varia-
tion in normative properties.
Whilst a brute diﬀerence in normative properties would indeed be problem-
atic, normative supervenience allows us to invoke diﬀerences in normative laws in
order to explain variation in normative properties. If x in w has normative prop-
erty N whilst y in w has some other normative property N, even though these
worlds are completely indiscernible in terms of descriptive properties, then this
diﬀerence is not brute but unproblematic as long as this variation can be explained
in terms of normative law L holding in w, whilst a diﬀerent law L holds in w.
A failure of metaphysical supervenience, whereby one ends up countenancing a
diﬀerence in properties that is unexplained and brute, diﬀers importantly from a
case in which one can appeal to the normative laws to explain the diﬀerences in
normative properties.
Although the diﬀerences in laws themselves will be brute, this is unproblem-
atic since the non-reductive realist can consider these laws to be fundamental and
irreducible. When construed as robust principles that govern grounding rela-
tions, they are to be understood as basic and not in need of explanation. This
means that, whereas normative properties are derivative properties and hence are
such that something is required to account for diﬀerences in these properties, no
underlying diﬀerence is required to account for diﬀerences in normative laws.
A related objection to the idea that normative propertiesmight only supervene
with normative necessity is that “it seems impossible that another world might be
identical to this one except that in that other world, a genocide otherwise identi-
cal to the actual Rwandan genocide diﬀered solely in being ethically wonderful,
rather than being an atrocity” (McPherson: , p. ). The thought is that a
supervenience claim with merely normative modal force only makes such objec-
tionable scenarios normatively impossible, since they are incompatible with the
actual normative laws, but allows for these scenarios to bemetaphysically possible.
The suggestion that metaphysical supervenience is required to preclude the
possibility of such objectionable scenarios is, however, problematic. This is be-
cause the rejection of metaphysical necessity does not imply that anything goes.
Accepting that normative principles can be metaphysically contingent is not to
say that anything could have been good or right, in the same way that saying that
Normative laws are not fundamental in the sense of occupying the basic level of a grounding
hierarchy, but rather in the sense of standing outside this hierarchy and inducing its structure.
If the laws themselves were to supervene on the descriptive facts, then it would not be pos-
sible for worlds that are indiscernible in terms of non-normative properties to diﬀer in terms of
laws. Likewise if the laws were merely to describe and summarise grounding relations, rather
than governing them, then a diﬀerence in laws would presuppose rather than explain a diﬀerence
in normative properties, thereby rendering normative variation across descriptively indiscernible
worlds a brute fact.
Analogously, diﬀerences in dispositional properties amongst objects that have the same cat-
egorical properties can be explained in terms of diﬀerences in causal laws, whereas diﬀerences in
causal laws will be basic (for those who consider them to be robust governing laws).

the causal laws could have been diﬀerent does not imply that anything could have
caused anything (or for that matter that there could be uncaused events).
In fact, there can be robust constraints (such as consistency and universalis-
ability requirements) on what the normative laws can be like, in the same way
as there are substantive constraints on what systems of causal laws can be like.
For instance, whilst it may be contingent what normative laws obtain, it may
be necessary that some normative laws or other do obtain. That is, it might be
necessary that there are laws without there being any necessary laws, thereby mak-
ing it metaphysically impossible for there to be amoral worlds (in the same way
as it may be metaphysically impossible for there to be acausal worlds). These
constraints will hold with metaphysical necessity and will delimit the range of
possible normative laws, potentially allowing one to rule out the objectionable
scenario envisaged by McPherson.
The real problem with addressing the supervenience argument by invoking
normative supervenience is rather that normativemodalitymight, for all we know,
coincide with metaphysical modality. The set of normatively possible worlds
might turn out to be the same as the set of metaphysically possible worlds, in
which case even normative supervenience would imply the existence of non-
normative properties that are metaphysically necessarily co-extensive with norma-
tive properties. This happens on views that countenance a unique set of normative
principles that hold in all metaphysically possible worlds. On such views, nor-
mative supervenience will suﬃce for necessary co-extensiveness with respect to
metaphysical modality and hence would seem to preclude the existence of irre-
ducibly normative properties.
In fact, the most plausible forms of moral realism do not allow for varia-
tion in normative laws. If normative laws were to be metaphysically contingent,
then very serious epistemological concerns would arise. Contingency amounts
to there being a range of systems of laws that hold in diﬀerent regions of modal
space. The problem then is to identify the laws that hold in the actual world. Un-
like in the case of causation, where we experience the things standing in causal
relations and thereby can identify patterns of interaction, we cannot identify nor-
mative laws a posteriori. Since normative facts are metaphysically independent
of non-normative facts according to the contingency proposal, which means that
So far, all that has been shown is that the possibility of these scenarios might be ruled out,
and that a denial of metaphysical supervenience, accordingly, does not imply a commitment to
their possibility. A fully satisfactory reply would require one to specify the precise nature of these
constraints, showing how exactly they manage to preclude objectionable scenarios.
This (epistemic) possibility cannot be ruled out even by those who consider normative ne-
cessity to be an irreducible necessity (pace Fine: , p. ).
These principles have, what Enoch calls, modally maximal jurisdiction (cf. Enoch: ,
p. ). Whether normative principles do vary across modal space is not a normative but a
metaphysical matter (contra Scanlon: , p. ), i.e. the scope of these principles is a function
of the metaphysical status of their source.

descriptively indistinguishable worlds can diﬀer with respect to normative laws
and hence diﬀer in terms of normative facts, there is no way to identify them
on the basis of non-normative facts. One would thus need some form of direct
access to the normative facts, for instance via a quasi-perceptual faculty. Not
only do we lack such a faculty, this would imply an implausible methodology for
ethics, namely a scientiﬁc methodology based on gathering data and identifying
patterns. Nor can the normative laws be identiﬁed a priori since the contingency
of the laws ensures that it is a brute fact as to which laws happen to obtain in the
actual world that cannot be discerned by reasoning. Since the laws are brute and
the evaluative properties the grounding of which they govern are unobservable,
there does not seem to be any way for us to identify them. This means that, even
if one can identify a priori the range of possible systems of normative laws, one
cannot identify which ones obtain in the actual world. All that can be identi-
ﬁed is the invariant core of these possible systems. Yet, this core may very well
be empty and any diﬀerences beyond the core are brute diﬀerences that are not
epistemically accessible to us.
Moreover, invoking normative supervenience to defend irreducibility does
not adequately capture the diﬀerence and heterogeneity between normative and
non-normative properties. The distinctness of these properties should not be
contingent on how normative modality is related to metaphysical modality (i.e.
it should not be dependent on the modal status of the normative laws). A theory
that has to rely on the normatively possible worlds forming a proper subset of
those that are metaphysically possible does not adequately respect and capture
the fact that these properties are diﬀerent in kind and do not merely diﬀer in
extension across modal space. In short, it is the nature of these properties that
should account for their distinctness (and that should also explain any diﬀerences
in extensions across possible worlds), not the relation between normatively and
metaphysically possible worlds.
Accordingly, one needs an alternative theory that is hyperintensional in char-
acter, that generates a robust diﬀerence in kind between normative and non-
normative properties, and that does not require normative modality to be re-
stricted, in the sense of the normatively possible worlds forming a proper subset
of the metaphysically possible worlds.
These epistemological considerations give us reasons for holding that normative laws are
invariant across modal space, that morality is not a brute phenomenon that just happens to be a
certain way in the actual world, but that there are reasons for it being the way it actually is and that
its laws are intelligible and can be identiﬁed by reasoning. Unfortunately, they do not constitute
reasons as to why this is the case and realists will need to provide an explanation for there being
a unique set of principles, ideally by identifying a modally invariant source. This explanation
will have to account for the disanalogy between causation and morality, explaining why there is
co-extensiveness of metaphysical and normative possibility in the moral case, even though there
is no analogous co-extensiveness in the causal case.
As we will see later on, it turns out that the very same commitments that a realist requires in

An analogous problem arises in the case of dispositions when nomological
possibility is taken to coincide with metaphysical possibility. Views that consider
nomological possibility to be co-extensive with metaphysical possibility (such as
certain versions of dispositional essentialism) will not be able to distinguish dispo-
sitional properties from their corresponding disjunctive categorical counterparts
in terms of their extensions across modal space. The nomological principles con-
necting dispositional properties to their categorical bases will then hold in the
same set of circumstances as the metaphysical principles connecting disjunctive
properties to their disjuncts.
This is problematic since the diﬀerence between dispositional and categorical
properties is meant to be a diﬀerence in kind that should not depend on the
relation between these two types of modality (nor on the status of the causal
laws). In order to avoid reducibility and preserve the idea that categorical and
dispositional properties are diﬀerent in kind, one should not rely on the idea that
the diﬀerent modal strengths that are involved in nomological and metaphysical
supervenience lead to diﬀerent extensions across modal space. Instead, one has
to bring in hyperintensional resources.
 Hyperintensional diﬀerences
Although it is possible to deny necessary co-extensiveness with respect to meta-
physical modality by arguing for a restricted normative supervenience claim, this
response does not really get to the heart of the matter. Accordingly, it is preferable
to ﬁnd a response that succeeds even if metaphysically necessary co-extensiveness
is granted.
A plausible alternative consists in rejecting premise  by denying that nec-
essarily co-extensive properties have to be identical. The suggestion is that non-
reductionism can be salvaged by rejecting the idea that intensional equivalence,
i.e. having the same extension across modal space, suﬃces for identity (cf. Shafer-
Landau: ; Majors: ; Suikkanen: ). Instead of individuating prop-
erties intensionally, one adopts a hyperintensional account that allows necessar-
ily co-extensive properties to be distinct. This would seem to avoid the com-
mitment to reducibility by opening up room for the possibility that normative
properties are distinct from non-normative properties, despite being necessarily
co-extensive. In the same way that necessarily co-extensive properties, such as tri-
angularity and trilaterality, can be distinct, so can normative properties be distinct
from their non-normative disjunctive counterparts. This is the standard reply to
order to justify scope restrictions (i.e. consider laws as holding in a restricted set of metaphysically
possible worlds) also allow us to address the case where normative supervenience goes together
with metaphysically necessary co-extensiveness. The restriction strategy thus presupposes the very
same hyperintensional resources that are employed in the defence of irreducibly normative prop-
erties that is provided later on and that does not require or involve any restrictions.

the supervenience argument.
Simply denying that all necessarily co-extensive properties are identical and
saying that property identity is a hyperintensional matter, however, leaves much
open. Though opening up room for the distinctness of normative properties
from descriptive properties, it is far from being suﬃcient for a full-ﬂedged de-
fence of irreducibly normative properties. In order for this line of response to be
substantiated, one needs to provide a ﬁne-grained theory of properties that spec-
iﬁes the identity conditions of properties and that explains how hyperintensional
diﬀerences can arise. What is required is a satisfactory account of the identity
conditions of properties that explains which necessarily co-extensive properties
are identical and which ones distinct.
The proposed theory has to do two things if it is to salvage the idea of irre-
ducibly normative properties. First, it needs to establish distinctness. One has to
show that normative properties and their descriptive disjunctive counterparts in
fact turn out to be distinct on the proposed theory. In this way, one can explain
what accounts for their distinctness and what thereby distinguishes these prop-
erties from other ‘pairs’ of necessarily co-extensive properties that are identical.
Second, it needs to establish a diﬀerence in kind. Not only do normative and
non-normative properties have to be distinct, they also have to diﬀer in kind.
This means that the proposed theory has to account for the diﬀerences between
these properties and explain how it is that they diﬀer in kind, i.e. why one is
normative whereas the other is non-normative despite being so intimately con-
nected (in particular, despite being necessarily co-extensive and, as we will see
later, despite having the very same grounds).
Moreover, in order for such a theory to be satisfactory, it has to satisfy the
requirement (which we can call the ‘worldliness constraint’) that it tracks worldly
diﬀerences, rather than simply identifying diﬀerences in how we pick out prop-
erties and represent the world. The diﬀerences that it posits amongst properties
must be ontologically robust. As Jackson notes, the account has to ensure that
a property is “an aspect of the world, not an aspect of our discourse or thought
about it” (Jackson: , p. ). Otherwise, we will not end up with a real
distinction but with a merely nominal distinction. For instance, a satisfactory
theory needs to yield the verdicts that (F ^G) is identical to (G ^ F), that :::F
is identical to :F, and that ((F ^ G) ^H) is identical to (F ^ (G ^H)) as well as
to the ternary conjunction
VfF, G, Hg. Any theory that treats such properties
as distinct draws invidious distinctions and cannot claim to be tracking worldly
diﬀerences.
This means that the theory needs to be ﬁne-grained without being too ﬁne-
grained. Theories of property individuation form a spectrum. At one end of the
spectrum are ultra coarse-grained theories that collapse all distinctions amongst
properties, whereas at the other end of the spectrum are ultra ﬁne-grained the-
ories, according to which every way of picking out a property corresponds to a

distinct property. What is required is a systematic and principled account that is
more ﬁne-grained than intensional equivalence without being too ﬁne-grained.
Otherwise one will no longer be in the realm of the worldly but in the realm of
the conceptual, identifying merely nominal rather than real diﬀerences. In short,
one needs a worldly notion of hyperintensional equivalence.
ultra fine-grained
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fine-grained
Theworldliness constraint can be satisﬁed by individuating properties in terms
of their basic grounds. Given the set of fundamental properties F that con-
tains all those properties that are ungrounded, we can construct the set of ba-
sic grounders B, which consists of all compatible pluralities (including degen-
erate pluralities) of fundamental properties. The grounding set g(F) of a prop-
erty F is that set that contains all basic proper and improper grounders of F, i.e.
g(F) = f  2 B :   grounds Fg. Two (non-fundamental) properties F and G
are then identical iﬀ they are hyperintensionally equivalent, i.e. g(F) = g(G).
One thereby recognises that properties can be had in diﬀerent ways, assessing
not only whether a property is had but also how it is had. One moves away from
an extensional understanding that only considers whether a property is had to a
hyperintensional account that is also concerned with the ways in which a property
is had. Property identity then requires properties to be had in the very same ways,
which allows there to be properties that are instantiated by the same possibilia
but that can be distinct, given that they are had in diﬀerent ways due to being
grounded diﬀerently. Such a theory provides a more ﬁne-grained individuation
than necessary co-extension, whilst identifying worldly diﬀerences insofar as the
distinctness of properties is explained in terms of there being diﬀerent features
of the world that account for their instantiations. As a result, we are not merely
dealing with “a separation inmodes of representation in thought” (Jackson: ,
p. ) but with a genuine separation in reality.
It might then be thought that the crucial step of the supervenience argument,
that moves from necessary co-extension to identity, can be rejected by requiring
properties to be not only intensionally but also hyperintensionally equivalent and
that normative properties can, accordingly, be distinguished from non-normative
properties, thereby avoiding a commitment to reductionism.
The resulting hyperintensional logic is developed in “Hyperintensional equivalence” (Bader:
manuscript).

 The grounding argument
Rejecting necessary co-extension as the criterion for property identity, however,
does not suﬃce for defending the irreducibility of the normative. This is because
there is an analogous grounding argument that functions as the hyperintensional
analogue of the supervenience argument.
0. normative properties are grounded in non-normative properties
0. the set of non-normative properties is closed under inﬁnitary
disjunction and conjunction
0. disjunctive properties are (individually) grounded in their disjuncts
0. conjunctive properties are (collectively) grounded in their conjuncts
) for every normative property there is a hyperintensionally equivalent
non-normative property
0. hyperintensionally equivalent properties are identical
) every normative property is identical to a non-normative property
If normative properties do not only supervene on non-normative properties but
are grounded therein, then for every normative property N there is a disjunc-
tive descriptive property D that is grounded in precisely the same non-normative
properties as N, thereby threatening non-reductionism even within a hyperin-
tensional setting. Merely claiming that properties can be distinct despite being
necessarily co-extensive thus does not suﬃce for defending irreducibility.
Premise 0 holds that normative properties are grounded in descriptive prop-
erties in the sense that whenever a normative property N is instantiated there are
certain descriptive properties in virtue of which N is instantiated. This strength-
ening of the claim that normative properties strongly supervene should be un-
problematic, given that grounding relations are precisely the kinds of explanatory
relations that supervenience relations are meant to model and in terms of which
supervenience claims can ultimately be explained and justiﬁed.
On the one hand, the motivations and intuitions cited in favour of superve-
nience usually take the form of resultance intuitions, whereby instantiations of
normative properties are taken to be explained by instantiations of non-normative
properties. Properly capturing these intuitions requires not only accepting the
dependent-variation of normative on non-normative properties that is encapsu-
lated by a supervenience claim, but a commitment to a grounding relation con-
necting these properties.
On the other hand, even those motivated by the thought that certain facts
simply could not have failed to have the normative status that they do have (e.g.
that genocide is wrong, cf. McPherson: , p. ) naturally end up endors-
ing a grounding claim. This is because accepting a supervenience claim engen-
If the disjuncts are compatible, then the disjunction can also be collectively grounded in
them taken together.

ders an explanatory burden that needs to be discharged. This burden is partic-
ularly pressing, given the heterogeneity of normative and non-normative prop-
erties endorsed by the non-reductive realist. Unless there is some dependence
relation between these properties, it would seem that they can be independently
recombined, which would undermine the supervenience claim. The necessary
dependent-variation should, accordingly, not be brute but explicable.
This can be achieved by positing a grounding relation. This ensures that
the properties cannot be independently recombined but that there is dependent-
variation of the grounded properties on their grounds. A grounding relation ex-
plains why that which is dependent, namely the normative, varies with that on
which it depends, namely the non-normative. The grounding of normative in
non-normative properties implies the supervenience of the former on the latter,
thereby allowing us to discharge the explanatory burden that is incurred when
positing the supervenience of the normative. The supervening set consists of nor-
mative properties N …Nn. Each such property Ni has instantiations ni …n
n
i ,
whereby every instance nji will be grounded in a collection of instantiations of
descriptive properties D …Dn, such that the subvening set of base properties
will consist of the union of these collections of descriptive properties for all in-
stances of all normative properties. The fact that objects that do not diﬀer
non-normatively cannot diﬀer normatively is then explained on the basis that
normative properties are resultant properties that are grounded in non-normative
properties. This means that denying premise 0 either leads to an objectionable
commitment to brute necessary connections or alternatively to an implausible
rejection of strong supervenience.
It might be suggested that premise 0 only appears innocuous because of an
equivocation. Given that grounding can be either full or partial, there are two
construals of this premise.
0-full: ‘normative properties are fully grounded in non-normative properties’.
0-partial: ‘normative properties are partially grounded in non-normative prop-
erties’.
The grounding argument presupposes the former reading. In order for N to have
the very same grounds as D, N has to be fully grounded in the relevant non-
normative properties out of which D is constructed. Otherwise, the grounding
set of D would only be a proper subset of that of N, in which case D would
not be identical to N but would rather be a (non-basic) ground of N. It might
now be objected that normative properties are only partially grounded in non-
normative properties since they are also partially grounded in normative laws, i.e.
that non-normative properties only ground normative properties together with
For some types of supervenience claims, the base will consist of the Boolean closure of this
set rather than of the set itself.

the normative laws. On such a view, normative properties have diﬀerent grounds
than their descriptive disjunctive counterparts because the former are not only
grounded in non-normative properties but also in laws.
However, to think of the laws as being grounds involves a confusion of lev-
els. One has to distinguish good-makers (i.e. grounds) from makers of good-
makers (i.e. grounding principles). Including the laws amongst the grounds is
analogous to including inference rules amongst the premises, yet we do not infer
q from: . p, . if p then q, and . modus ponens, but rather infer q via modus
ponens from the two premises: . p, and . if p then q. Rather than them-
selves being premises, the inference rules connect the premises to the conclusion.
Likewise, it is analogous to considering laws of nature to be partial causes, which
is confused since the breaking of the window is not caused by the causal laws
together with the throwing of the stone. Instead, the laws govern the causal rela-
tions between causes and eﬀects. Normative laws, inference rules, and causal laws
all play an important role, yet one that is distinct from that played by grounds,
premises, and causes.
Since normative laws do not ground normative properties but govern the
grounding relations connecting non-normative grounds to normative properties,
they are not to be included amongst the grounds but amongst the grounding
principles. Rather than normative properties being metaphysically grounded in
non-normative properties together with the normative laws, they are normatively
grounded in the non-normative properties via these laws. Put diﬀerently, they
modify the grounding relation rather than featuring as relata. There is hence
no diﬀerence in terms of what these normative and descriptive properties are
grounded in. Instead, as we will see in section , there is only a diﬀerence in
terms of how they are grounded in the base that they share.
Premise 0 is unchanged. This premise is very plausible, since it is diﬃcult to
see how conjoining and disjoining non-normative properties could ensure that
the resulting property would fail to be non-normative. At any rate, the propo-
nent of irreducibly normative properties (to whom this argument is addressed)
should have no qualms with this premise, given that he considers normative and
non-normative properties to diﬀer in kind. Such a diﬀerence in kind cannot be
straddled by simply conjoining or disjoining non-normative properties.
Premises 0 and 0 are likewise uncontroversial. The grounding of disjunc-
tive and conjunctive properties in their constituents is usually considered to be a
paradigm case of grounding. (Whilst these premises themselves are uncontrover-
sial, certain diﬃculties arise when employing them in constructing hyperinten-
sionally equivalent properties, as we will see in sections  and .)
These premises imply that for every normative property, there is a descriptive
Cf. “Two levels of good-making” (Bader: manuscript).
The fact that the relevant closure conditions require inﬁnitary property-forming operations
is unproblematic, cf. Bader:  contra Glanzberg: .

property that has the very same grounds. This is because every (actual as well
as possible) instantiation ni of a normative property N is grounded in a collec-
tion of instantiations of non-normative properties  i. All the diﬀerent plural-
ities   : : : n that ground instantiations n : : : nn together constitute the basic
grounders of N, i.e. the members of N’s grounding set g(N). Out of these plural-
ities we can construct a disjunctive descriptive property D that has the very same
grounds as N by disjoining the conjunctive properties that are formed by conjoin-
ing the members of  i for every possible instantiation ni of N. More precisely,
for any  i we form a conjunctive property ^ i (which equals F ^ F : : : ^ Fn
for all Fi that are amongst  i). By disjoining all such conjunctive properties one
ends up with a property D =
Wf^ i for all  i 2 g(N)g that is not only nec-
essarily co-extensive with N but that also has the very same grounds, since both
have   : : : n as their basic grounders, i.e. g(D) = g(N).
Given the closure of non-normative properties under inﬁnitary conjunction
and disjunction, this implies that the disjunctive property D that is hyperinten-
sionally equivalent to a particular normative property N will be a non-normative
property. And given that hyperintensionally equivalent properties are identical,
normative properties then turn out to be identical to non-normative properties.
Claiming that properties are distinct becomes problematic when they are not
only had by the same possibilia but are also such that the very same facts explain
why these properties are had. Since there does not seem to be anything in the
world that can render them distinct, it is rather diﬃcult to account for their dis-
tinctness in a way that satisﬁes the worldliness constraint, such that we do not
merely end up with a distinction at the level of description or representation but
with a genuine diﬀerence in the world.
Critics of the supervenience argument frequently appeal to the (supposed)
distinctness of triangularity and trilaterality and suggest that the distinctness of
normative properties and their disjunctive counterparts can be understood along
the same lines. The fact that triangularity and trilaterality are distinct properties
can, however, be explained in terms of these properties having diﬀerent grounds.
The former property is had in virtue of having three angles, whereas the latter is
had in virtue of having three sides. Diﬀerent features of the world account for
and give rise to these properties, thereby rendering them distinct.
The disjunctive property formed in this way need not be identical to the disjunctive property
formed by disjoining the conjunctions of B-properties on which the normative property super-
venes, even when making use of a minimal supervenience base that does not include B-maximal
properties that correspond to B-descriptions of the whole world but that only characterise the
object’s B-nature whilst leaving out irrelevant information. These properties can diverge where
a property is overgrounded and where one basic ground is part of another, as happens when ab-
sorption principles fail. This divergence arises because grounding is characterised by a relevance
constraint, whereas supervenience is subject to a more restrictive minimality constraint. For in-
stance, F is distinct from H =df (F _ (F ^ G)), allowing for F as well as the plurality F  G to
be in the grounding set of H, yet only F is in the supervenience base, since F  G satisﬁes the
relevance condition but not the minimality constraint.

Yet, no such explanation is forthcoming in the case of normative properties
and their disjunctive descriptive counterparts. These properties have the same
grounding sets. Whatever grounds the former also grounds the latter, and vice
versa. There is no diﬀerence in terms of what grounds these properties, no dif-
ference in terms of the features of the world that explain and give rise to them.
There would, accordingly, not seem to be any genuine worldly diﬀerence between
them, but merely a diﬀerence in terms of how we conceptualise and represent
them. These properties are not only intensionally but also hyperintensionally
equivalent and thus seem to be identical.
Accordingly, it turns out that the problem runs much deeper and that sim-
ply adopting a ﬁne-grained criterion for individuating properties does not suf-
ﬁce for addressing this challenge to non-reductionist forms of moral realism. To
circumvent the grounding argument one not only has to deny that necessary
co-extensiveness suﬃces for identity, but also deny premise 0, namely that hy-
perintensional equivalence suﬃces for identity. Doing so, however, would saddle
one with an ultra ﬁne-grained theory of properties that has no longer any claim to
identifying genuine diﬀerences in the world. This is because any diﬀerence more
ﬁne-grained than hyperintensional equivalence understood in terms of sameness
of basic grounders would not seem to satisfy the worldliness constraint.
Moreover, any theory that distinguishes (non-fundamental) properties that
do not diﬀer in terms of how they are grounded conﬂicts with the idea that the
identity conditions of non-basic entities are provided by and speciﬁed in terms
of the basic entities on which they depend, in this case that non-fundamental
properties are individuated in terms of the fundamental properties in which they
are grounded. Derivative entities are to be understood in terms of the things
from which they derive, i.e. to be a particular derivative entity just is to be that
entity which derives in certain ways from certain non-derivative entities. Since the
identity of derivative properties is ﬁxed by the fundamental properties fromwhich
they derive, it follows that sameness of grounds implies sameness of properties.
Relatedly, what higher-order properties derivate entities have, as well as what
grounding work they can perform, is ﬁxed by the non-derivative entities from
which they derive. This means that one cannot explain the distinctness of N and
D by appealing to diﬀerences in terms of what higher-order properties they have,
nor to diﬀerences in terms of whatN andD can ground. Attempts to use Leibniz’s
Law applied to properties in order to establish their distinctness accordingly fail.
Arguments to the eﬀect that normative and non-normative properties diﬀer in
terms of their higher-order properties and are hence distinct face the problem
that higher-order properties are determined either by the lower-order properties
or by the grounds of those properties. This, in turn, implies that any normative
This kind of Leibniz’s Law argument has been developed by Suikkanen: , section .
Similarly, Enoch appeals to the idea that normative properties play diﬀerent roles than their de-
scriptive counterparts in arguing for their distinctness, cf. Enoch: , p. .

property N will have the same higher-order properties as its non-normative dis-
junctive counterpart D, on the basis of these properties having the same grounds.
A diﬀerence in higher-order properties thus presupposes distinctness rather than
establishing it.
This problem is analogous to the grounding problem regarding coinciding en-
tities. In that context, the pluralist’s appeal to Leibniz’s Law is problematic, given
that the diﬀerences in properties amongst coinciding objects that the pluralist in-
vokes lack a ground, due to the fact that coinciding objects share the same super-
venience base. Likewise, the sameness of grounds of these necessarily co-extensive
properties makes it diﬃcult to explain how they could diﬀer in higher-order prop-
erties. The task is thus to explain what accounts for the diﬀerences amongst them
in terms of how these properties are grounded, rather than to presuppose there
being diﬀerences amongst them and then appealing to these diﬀerences to argue
for their distinctness. As we will see below, the diﬀerences that separate these
properties cannot be explained by identifying diﬀerent grounds (since they share
the very same grounds), but instead by identifying diﬀerent grounding relations
via which these properties are grounded.
 Interlude on reduction
The grounding argument threatens to rule out irreducibly normative properties
insofar as it establishes that for every normative property N there is a hyperinten-
sionally equivalent descriptive property D. The reducibility of normative proper-
ties consists in there being descriptive properties to which they are identical. This
means that the reduction of the normative is not a matter of the ‘vertical’ relation
between N and its various grounds, but is rather concerned with the ‘horizon-
tal’ relation between N and D. The normative property N is not reduced to its
grounds (whether taken individually or collectively). Instead, a property identity
is established between N and the disjunctive property D that has the very same
grounds as N.
It might be objected that reduction is an asymmetrical notion, i.e. if x is
reduced to y then y cannot be reduced to x, yet that property identities are sym-
metrical. The asymmetry of reduction is, however, compatible with construing
reduction as establishing property identities. This is because reducing the norma-
tive to the descriptive amounts to establishing that for every normative property
there is a descriptive property to which it is identical but that it is not the case
that every descriptive property has a corresponding normative property to which
it is identical. The asymmetry is to be found at the level of classes of properties,
A further similarity to the case of coinciding objects is that the pluralist needs to show that
the diﬀerences in higher-order properties are genuine diﬀerences that cannot be explained away
by means of predicational shifts (as Streumer attempts to do by invoking diﬀerent modes of
presentation, cf. Streumer: , p. ).

not at the level of the particular properties between which property identities are
established. Although the relation between a particular normative property N
and its descriptive disjunctive counterpart D is a symmetrical identity relation,
the relation between the class of normative properties and the class of descriptive
properties is asymmetric since the former will be a proper subset of the latter.
A further objection to this understanding of reduction is that property identi-
ties are metaphysically uninteresting. Schroeder, for instance, has claimed that “it
makes reductive views out not to really be theses of metaphysics at all, but only
in the philosophy of language or epistemology” (cf. Schroeder: , p. ).
The thought seems to be that identities are trivial from a metaphysical point of
view since everything is identical to itself and to nothing else, such that a property
identity does not tell us anything about the property itself but only something
about language, namely that we pick out the same property by means of diﬀerent
expressions, i.e. we learn that certain expressions are co-referring.
This critique, however, is misguided since it is a substantive metaphysical
matter whether the property identities required for the reducibility of normative
to descriptive properties can be established.
First, there is the (relatively uncontroversial) issue of the closure conditions
that apply to descriptive properties. For there to be a reductive identity, the
disjunctive property D has to be a descriptive property, which means that the
reductive identity presupposes certain closure conditions. Since it is a non-trivial
matter which property-forming operations preserve the properties required for
classifying as a descriptive property, the reductive identity will not be trivial but
metaphysically substantive.
Second, as we will see in the next section, there is the issue of the nature of
the grounding relation giving rise to normative properties, in particular whether
the disjunctive property D is grounded in the very same way (that is, via the
same grounding relation) as the normative property N. If the relevant closure
conditions hold and if the same grounding relation is at issue, then D and N will
be identical, where this is a substantive metaphysical claim that is established on
the basis of metaphysical reasoning that reveals something important about the
nature of normative properties, namely how such properties are grounded, and
not merely something about how we pick out properties.
Third, as we have just seen, the reducibility of the normative is not a claim
about a particular property identity but a claim about an entire class of properties.
This means that, even if particular property identities should not be metaphysi-
cally interesting, it would nevertheless be a metaphysically substantive matter that
all normative properties are identical to descriptive properties but not vice versa,
i.e. that the former constitute a proper subset of the latter.
For a more detailed treatment of the relation between reduction and grounding cf. “Ground-
ing, reduction and analysis” (Bader: manuscript).

 Normative grounding
Instead of rejecting hyperintensional equivalence as the criterion of property iden-
tity, one should reﬁne the understanding of hyperintensional equivalence and dis-
tinguish the diﬀerent types of grounding relations that are involved in grounding
the normative and the corresponding non-normative property. One thereby en-
sures that the two properties turn out to be hyperintensionally inequivalent after
all. Whilst they neither diﬀer in terms of their extensions across modal space, nor
in terms of their grounds, one can nonetheless distinguish them in terms of the
respective grounding relations that they involve.
In particular, whereas the normative property is normatively grounded, the
disjunctive non-normative property is metaphysically grounded. Premise 0 then
becomes *: ‘normative properties are normatively grounded in non-normative
properties’, whereas premises 0 and 0 become *: ‘disjunctive properties are
(individually) metaphysically grounded in their disjuncts’ and *: ‘conjunctive
properties are (collectively) metaphysically grounded in their conjuncts’, from
which one can no longer derive the existence of a hyperintensionally equivalent
non-normative property corresponding to any given normative property.
Hyperintensional equivalence, accordingly, has to be understood as requir-
ing not only sameness of grounds but also that the properties are grounded in the
same ways, i.e. that the types of grounding relations that give rise to them are
the same. This means that the theory that was sketched above needs to be sup-
plemented by introducing a range of diﬀerent grounding relations, such as meta-
physical grounding (gM), normative grounding (gN), and nomological grounding
(gC). The i-grounding set gi(F) does not have to contain basic grounders, i.e. it
is not required that   2 B in order for   2 gi(F). Instead, it contains the
(proper and improper) i-basic grounds of F that are the ultimate grounds in i-
grounding chains giving rise to F, i.e. gi(F) = f  :   groundsi F ^ :9Δ(Δ 6=
  ^ Δ groundsi  )g, where every property is an improper ground of itself with
respect to every grounding relation. Identity then requires not only that prop-
Normative properties are normatively grounded in non-normative properties in the sense that
every normative instantiation of a normative property will be such that some link in its grounding
chain involves a normative grounding relation. Not every link connecting the normative to the
non-normative needs to involve normative grounding since non-basic normative properties are
metaphysically grounded in other normative properties (e.g. N_N is metaphysically grounded
in its disjuncts). The restriction to normative instantiations is required because disjunctive prop-
erties such as N _ D might well be classiﬁed as normative, but can be metaphysically grounded
in their non-normative disjuncts. When dealing with this kind of disjunctive property one has to
distinguish between normative and non-normative instantiations. It is normatively instantiated if
it obtains in virtue of N whereas it is non-normatively instantiated if it obtains in virtue of D (this
is analogous to how a disjunctive property can be had intrinsically and/or extrinsically depending
on whether it is had in virtue of its intrinsic and/or extrinsic disjuncts).
In case normative laws should be metaphysically contingent and should admit of variation
across modal space, one would have to specify not only the type of grounding relation but also

erties are grounded in the same things but also that they are grounded in them
via the same relations, such that (non-fundamental) properties F and G are iden-
tical iﬀ gi(F) = gi(G) for some grounding relation gi. This allows some non-
fundamental properties to be individuated in terms of (pluralities of ) other (more
fundamental) non-fundamental properties, generating a recursive structure that
ultimately terminates in basic grounders, i.e. in compatible pluralities of funda-
mental properties, where fundamental properties are i-basic with respect to every
i-grounding chain.
This modiﬁcation ensures that we take into consideration not only the re-
lata of the grounding relation but also the nature of the grounding relation.
Diﬀerences between (non-fundamental) properties still have to be grounding-
diﬀerences, yet this is no longer understood merely in terms of having diﬀerent
grounds but also in terms of being grounded in diﬀerent ways. Since the rela-
tion connecting the grounds to what is grounded therein is a worldly matter, this
reﬁned condition satisﬁes the worldliness constraint. The diﬀerences between
properties that it identiﬁes are thus genuine distinctions in the world that are ei-
ther due to diﬀerent aspects of the world accounting for the diﬀerent properties
or due to the properties being grounded in diﬀerent ways.
Normative properties and their disjunctive descriptive counterparts do not
satisfy the conditions of hyperintensional equivalence once one distinguishes nor-
mative from metaphysical grounding. N and D will have diﬀerent i-grounding
sets, i.e. gi(N) 6= gi(D) for all grounding relations gi. Normative properties
and their non-normative counterparts are thus distinct, not because they have dif-
ferent grounds, but because they are grounded in the same grounds in diﬀerent
ways, namely via diﬀerent types of grounding relations. This holds even if meta-
physical and normative modality should turn out to be co-extensive, i.e. even if
there is a unique set of norms that holds in all metaphysically possible worlds.
Non-reductionist versions of moral realism, accordingly, require a commitment
to there being irreducibly distinct types of grounding relations.
In particular, one has to think of the normative grounding relations as being
governed by robust grounding principles. This is because it is not possible tomake
sense of   normatively grounding N whilst metaphysically grounding D unless
these are distinct grounding relations that operate in accordance with diﬀerent
principles. The diﬀerences between N and D are to be explained in terms of the
diﬀerences in the relations giving rise to them. Normative grounding principles
thus need to be distinct from those involved in metaphysical grounding and need
relativise grounds to sets of worlds (or better, to sets of norms), so that grounding sets have the
following form: gN(F) = f jw:::wi ;Δjwj:::wk ;jwl:::wng.
They will only have the same grounding set with respect to the generic grounding relation g_
which is constructed by taking the transitive closure of the various speciﬁc grounding relations.
Dispositional essentialists who consider nomological andmetaphysical possibility to coincide
can likewise distinguish dispositional properties from their disjunctive categorical counterparts
insofar as the former are nomologically grounded, whilst the latter are metaphysically grounded.

to be prior to the grounding facts that they govern. These grounding principles
cannot be mere descriptions of patterns of grounding facts but have to be doing
substantive work and have to be appealed to in individuating grounding relations.
Normative properties are thus irreducible because they are grounded diﬀer-
ently, where this does not involve being grounded in diﬀerent things but, instead,
being grounded via diﬀerent grounding relations. This explanation satisﬁes the
worldliness constraint, since there is something worldly that accounts for the dis-
tinctness of these properties, namely the diﬀerent grounding relations that give
rise to them. In this way, one can ensure that there are genuine worldly dif-
ferences between them. The distinction between normative and non-normative
properties, accordingly, classiﬁes as a real rather than merely nominal distinction.
By accepting such diﬀerent grounding relations, one can, moreover, explain
why normative properties diﬀer in kind from their disjunctive descriptive coun-
terparts. The diﬀerence in the nature of the grounding relation generates diﬀer-
ences in the kinds of property being grounded. There is thus no need to reject the
closure principles. The account can, in this way, respect the fact that one cannot
arrive at a normative property by simply putting together various non-normative
properties. By disjoining and conjoining non-normative properties one only gen-
erates further non-normative properties. To end up with a normative property,
one needs to do something else, namely bring in a normative grounding relation.
In this way, one can explain the heterogeneity of these properties, whilst at
the same time allowing them to be grounded in the same base. Sameness of
ground combined with diﬀerence in grounding relation explains both necessary
co-extensiveness as well as distinctness and diﬀerence in kind. On the one hand,
there is no need to posit any brute necessary connections, since the fact that
they are necessarily co-extensive is explained in terms of them having a common
ground. On the other hand, their radical heterogeneity is explained in terms of
them being grounded via diﬀerent types of grounding relations.
Relatedly, the commitment to normative grounding relations allows us to ex-
plain the irreducibility of normative properties on the basis of a commitment that
has a good claim to constituting the “core metaphysical thesis of non-naturalism”
and that genuinely classiﬁes as “a substantial (and controversial) thesis about the
metaphysics of the normative” (Dunaway: , p. ). That there is an ir-
reducibly diﬀerent normative grounding relation clearly is such a metaphysical
thesis. The property distinctness is thus explicable in terms of the very feature
that makes non-reductive or non-natural normative realism the distinctive and
The situation is analogous to the grounding problem regarding coinciding entities. In the
same way that diﬀerent types of grounding relations can generate diﬀerent properties out of the
same base, a mereological pluralist who recognises diﬀerent types of composition relations can
explain how diﬀerent objects can be generated out of the same parts.
Normative grounding explains why they will be co-extensive in (at least) all normatively
possible worlds. In case there should be a unique set of normative laws that holds in all of modal
space, then they will also be necessarily co-extensive with respect to metaphysical modality.

controversial theory that it is. In this way, the proposed account satisﬁes Dun-
away’s desideratum that the denial of the property identity follows from the core
commitment of non-naturalism and thereby distinguishes it from other cases,
such as the case of triangularity and trilaterality, in which necessarily co-extensive
properties are distinct but in which no analogous non-naturalist metaphysical
commitments are incurred.
A plurality of grounding relations thus allows us to explain the distinctness
and heterogeneity of normative and descriptive properties in terms of a commit-
ment that plausibly classiﬁes as the metaphysical core of non-naturalism, whilst
also explaining why these properties are necessarily co-extensive. This means that
we have a conditional argument to the eﬀect that one needs to countenance an ir-
reducibly distinct normative grounding relation if one is to defend non-reductive
moral realism against the grounding argument. In order to make plausible the
existence of a plurality of grounding relations, one needs to develop a systematic
theory of grounding principles that explains how they work and how they are to
be individuated. In particular, one needs to give an account of what grounding
principles there are that avoids a proliferation of diﬀerent grounding relations.
 Amalgamating normative grounds
In constructing the disjunctive descriptive counterpart D one disjoins the con-
junctive properties that are formed by conjoining the members of  i for every
possible instantiation ni of N. The disjunctive property D will only be hyperin-
tensionally equivalent to N, if the grounds of N satisfy an amalgamation condi-
tion that requires that compatible combinations of members of g(N) are them-
selves members of g(N). That is, if   and   are compatible (i.e.      2 B),
then their combination also has to be one of the  i such that they jointly ground
N. This is because a disjunction is grounded not only individually in (the basic
grounders of ) its disjuncts but also collectively when these are compatible.
The issue now is that it is not at all clear whether normative properties are
always collectively grounded in this way. For instance, a determinate evaluative
property, such as being valuable to degree= , can be grounded in diﬀerent com-
patible ways, such that something can have this property because of   as well
as because of  . Yet, these grounds do not collectively ground this evaluative
Accepting diﬀerent grounding relations implies accepting diﬀerent sources of necessity.
However, pace Fine:  pp. -, this does not mean that normative necessity cannot
be understood as a relative modality.
Cf. “Two levels of good-making” (Bader: manuscript) for discussion of these issues.
Whether this is possible depends on how value bearers are construed. If property instantia-
tions or states-of-aﬀairs constitute value bearers, then the claim that x is good because x is F is to
be construed as saying that x’s being F is good, i.e. not that x both has the property of being good
and the property of being F whereby the latter grounds the former, but rather that x is F where
x’s being F is the ground of the value of x’s being F. Accordingly, there will be two diﬀerent value

property. What corresponds to the grounds taken together is the object’s (non-
basic) value of degree= . That is, the object has basic value due to each ground
but not due to the grounds taken collectively. Instead, only non-basic value cor-
responds to the grounds taken together. Imposing the amalgamation constraint
on normative properties ensures that the combination of the two grounds also
classiﬁes as a ground of basic value, which in this case leads to overgenerating
value. To avoid this problematic consequence one needs to distinguish between
basic value that is normatively grounded in   as well as in  , and metaphys-
ically grounded non-basic value that corresponds to their combination, thereby
avoiding double-counting.
If the grounds of N do not amalgamate, then this precludes premise 0 from
playing its intended role, leading to a diﬀerence in grounds. The grounds of N
will then be a proper subset of those of D, since the latter will also include the
amalgamated grounds. Moreover, given that the grounding set for N fails to sat-
isfy the amalgamation condition that has to be satisﬁed by any metaphysically
grounded property, there will not be any metaphysically grounded property and
hence not any descriptive property that has the same grounds as N. Since reduc-
tion only works via metaphysical grounding relations (since they are required to
preserve the base properties in question), N will be irreducible.
Accordingly, it might seem that there is a diﬀerent way of avoiding the ground-
ing argument that does not appeal to normative grounding relations, namely by
pointing out that non-amalgamating normative properties are irreducibly norma-
tive because there are no descriptive properties that have the same grounds. This
diﬀerence between descriptive and non-amalgamating (basic) normative proper-
ties, however, can only arise because of a diﬀerence in grounding relations.
Amalgamation can be established for metaphysical grounding on the basis of
^-idempotency, i.e. the fact that F^F = F, together with the rule for conjoining
properties. ^-idempotency holds if   2 g(F) iﬀ   2 g(F ^ F). This is only the
case if metaphysically grounded properties satisfy the amalgamation constraint.
Otherwise, there could be compatible grounders of F, e.g. G and H, without
the conjunctive ground G H being a grounder of F, but this would imply that
the conjunctive ground would be in the grounding set of F ^ F. Contrary to ^-
idempotency, F and F ^ F would then have diﬀerent grounding sets, i.e. g(F) =
bearers, rather than one thing that is valuable both because of   and because of  .
Moreover, D and N will not even be necessarily co-extensive, since, although D will be instan-
tiated whenever N will be instantiated, they will not be instantiated by the same entity. D will
be a property of x, whereas N will be a property of the property instantiation. One can appeal to
descriptive properties of property instantiations to construct a disjunctive descriptive property D*
that is necessarily co-extensive with N, but this property will not be hyperintensionally equivalent
since N will be grounded in descriptive properties of x whereas D* will be grounded in descriptive
properties of property instantiations.
Some normative properties are normatively grounded both individually and collectively,
namely certain holistic goods, such that   and   both individually and collectively give rise
to basic value (though possibly to diﬀerent degrees of value).

fG;Hg but g(F ^ F) = fG;H;G Hg, and would hence be distinct.
Since the only metaphysical ground of a basic normative property N is the
improper ground, namely N itself, it follows that gM(N) = gM(N^N) = fNg.
^-idempotency is hence validated for normatively grounded properties even if
their normative grounds do not satisfy the amalgamation condition. There is thus
only one way in which a property can have non-amalgamating grounds without
violating ^-idempotency, namely insofar as the grounding relation involved in
N^N, which is metaphysical, is distinct from the grounding relation involved in
N. This means that only basic normative properties, i.e. properties that are nor-
matively grounded, can be non-amalgamating. Non-basic normative properties
that are metaphysically grounded in other normative properties have to satisfy
the amalgamation constraint.
N and D can thus be hyperintensionally inequivalent due to having diﬀerent
grounds, insofar as the grounding set of D satisﬁes amalgamation whereas that
of N does not (where this diﬀerence is only possible because these properties
are grounded via diﬀerent grounding relations). In this way, one can establish
the irreducibility of non-amalgamating normative properties. Yet when it comes
to normative properties that have incompatible grounds, as well as normative
properties the grounds of which are compatible but where N is also grounded
in the combination of those grounds (as happens in the case of certain holistic
goods), the grounding sets of N and D do not diﬀer in this way. To establish the
distinctness of such properties, one has to appeal not to a diﬀerence in grounds
but a diﬀerence in grounding relations.
 Conditional normative grounds
We have so far beenmaking use of a broad notion of grounding that includes con-
ditions (as well as modiﬁers), such that the grounds constitute a necessitating
base. Yet, in certain cases we need to draw more ﬁne-grained distinctions by dis-
tinguishing sources (or grounds narrowly construed) from conditions on which
the grounding relation merely depends. This is because certain normative prop-
erties are only conditionally grounded, requiring enablers to be present and/or
disablers to be absent. For instance, according to Kant, happiness is only good
when had by someone who has a good will.
Drawing such distinctions requires us to include additional structure into the
grounding set. Since we have to make room for conditions on grounding rela-
tions, we have to work with groundsC where an unconditional grounding relation
obtains if C = ;. The grounding set of a property F can be understood as follows:
g(F) = fh ;Ci :   2 B ^  groundsC Fg. Hyperintensional equivalence then
The discussion in this section applies mutatis mutandis to the case of modiﬁcation.
Cf. “Conditional grounding” (Bader: manuscript) for an account of conditional grounding,
and Bader:  for an application of conditionality and modiﬁcation to the normative realm.

requires that properties have the same grounds subject to the same conditions.
This means that properties can be distinct, despite having the same necessitation
base, due to having diﬀerently structured grounding sets, i.e. the elements of the
necessitation base can diﬀer in terms of whether they are assigned a grounding-
role or a condition-role
Premise 0 in the grounding argument should thus be replaced by 0-cond:
‘some normative properties are conditionally grounded in non-normative prop-
erties’ as well as 0-uncond: ‘some normative properties are unconditionally
grounded in non-normative properties’. Conjunctive grounding, however, is un-
conditional. This means that premise 0 is to be construed as 0-uncond: ‘all
conjunctive properties are (collectively) unconditionally grounded in their con-
juncts’, which implies that this premise can no longer play its intended role in
the argument. In particular, it will not be possible to construct a disjunctive
descriptive counterpart for a conditionally grounded normative property.
Every instantiation ni of such a property will be conditionally grounded in
some ground  i, such that this grounding relation only obtains because condi-
tion Ci is satisﬁed. As a result, g(N) = fh ;Ci; : : : ; h n;Cnig. One can
construct two diﬀerent descriptive properties. On the one hand, one can disjoin
the conjunctive properties that result from combining the members of  i, i.e.
D =
Wf^ i for all  i 2 g(N)g. This property will have the same grounds as
N but will not have the conditions built in, and as such will not even be exten-
sionally equivalent to N, since D will be had whereas N will be lacked whenever
the conditions are not satisﬁed (assuming that N is not overgrounded in those
cases). On the other hand, one can disjoin the conjunctive properties that result
from combining the members of  i as well as Ci, i.e. D =
Wf^( i ^ Ci) for all
h i;Cii 2 g(N)g. This property will be extensionally equivalent to N, yet will
be hyperintensionally distinct since the members of g(D) will not be structured
in the same way as g(N).
What is required for hyperintensional equivalence is that g(D) contains the
grounds of N where these grounds are subject to the very same conditions. Since
conjunctive grounding is unconditional, the disjuncts of D will not be conjunc-
tive properties, which means that the closure conditions speciﬁed in premise 0
are not applicable. Hyperintensional equivalence thus requires not only that de-
scriptive properties are closed under inﬁnitary conjunction and disjunction but
also that if   and C are descriptive, then a property conditionally grounded in  
subject to condition C will also be descriptive.
The problem now is that not every (consistent) combination of descriptive
grounds and conditions grounds a descriptive property. Conditional grounding
relations presuppose a mechanism of enabling or disabling that explains how the
non-satisfaction of the conditions undermines the grounding relation in ques-
tion. Whilst there are conditionally grounded descriptive properties, there is no
guarantee that there will be conditionality mechanisms operating at the descrip-

tive level that apply whenever a normative property N is conditionally grounded.
The reductive realist thus has to establish on a case by case basis that descriptive
conditionality mechanisms can be identiﬁed whenever normative conditionality
mechanisms apply.
This means that, although one can always construct a descriptive property
by conjoining and disjoining various descriptive properties, there is no guarantee
that one can always construct a conditionally grounded descriptive property. Hy-
perintensional equivalence can thus, in principle, only be established on the basis
of premise 0-uncond but not premise 0-cond. This means that the ground-
ing argument only shows that some normative properties (namely all those that
are unconditionally grounded) are such there is a non-normative property that is
hyperintensionally equivalent, which, together with the hyperintensional equiv-
alence criterion for property identity, in turn only establishes the restricted con-
clusion that some normative property (namely all those that are unconditionally
grounded) are identical to non-normative properties.
Considerations of conditionality imply that the grounding argument by itself
only establishes a restricted reducibility claim. This conclusion is still problem-
atic for the non-reductive moral realist and a commitment to grounding plural-
ism is required to establish irreducibility across the board. In addition, it can
be argued that (in those cases where conditionality cannot be motivated at the
descriptive level) the conditionality of normative properties itself presupposes a
commitment to grounding pluralism, since it is only by bringing in normative
grounding principles that one can explain why   fails to conditionally ground a
descriptive property D yet does conditionally ground a normative property N.
 Ethical idlers?
Bringing in normative grounding relations that are governed by normative ground-
ing principles also allows us to defuse the objection that “it is hard to see how the
further properties could be of any ethical signiﬁcance. Are we supposed to take
seriously someone who says, ‘I see that this action will kill many and save no-one,
but that is not enough to justify my not doing it; what really matters is that the
action has an extra property that only ethical terms are suited to pick out’? In
short, the extra properties would [be] ethical ‘idlers’.” (Jackson: , p. )
In response we can note that the non-normative features are ethically sig-
niﬁcant only on the basis that they ground normative properties and that their
doing so is dependent on the normative grounding principles. What matters is
that the action has the relevant non-normative properties that give rise to the nor-
mative property in question, e.g. those that justify the action. Precisely which
non-normative properties are relevant and account for the normative status of
the action is determined by the normative grounding principles. These principles
select amongst the vast array of non-normative features those that are relevant,

by making it the case that these features ground normative properties.
This means that non-normative features only have ethical signiﬁcance when
they fall under a normative grounding principle. They are ethically signiﬁcant
because they are imbued with normative signiﬁcance by the grounding principle.
Since the grounding principle is precisely what gets us to the normative property,
we can see that what it is for non-normative properties to have ethical signiﬁcance
is to give rise to normative properties. They are hence not ethical idlers but are
necessary for ethical signiﬁcance. In other words, the signiﬁcance and justiﬁcatory
force of the non-normative features lies precisely in the fact that they ground
normative properties. A full explanation of the normative status of the action in
this way cannot remain at the non-normative level, but has to invoke grounding
principles and go to the normative level.
That the signiﬁcance of non-normative properties is to be explained in this
way is particularly clear in cases in which they only conditionally ground nor-
mative properties, requiring enablers to be present and/or disablers to be absent.
These cases show that the properties that are selected at the non-normative level
do not by themselves suﬃce for grounding normative properties. Since they are
only conditional grounds, they only have normative signiﬁcance conditionally.
Accordingly, one has to appeal to the normative level to identify and explain the
conditions under which these features do in fact give rise to normative prop-
erties, namely when the enabling/disabling conditions are satisﬁed. This means
that these non-normative features are only to be selected under certain conditions,
where the selection is determined by the normative grounding principles.
Although one can fully specify in descriptive terms the necessitating base of
the goodness, the non-normative features on which the goodness supervenes need
to be distinguished into those things that are of ethical signiﬁcance and those that
merely constitute the conditions under which the former are of ethical signiﬁ-
cance. The explanation as to why these conditions need to be satisﬁed is precisely
because they are required for the (conditional) grounds to actually give rise to
normative properties and thereby acquire ethical signiﬁcance. One can, accord-
ingly, only explain the relevance of these conditions in terms of their eﬀect on the
grounding of normative properties. This means that normative properties turn
out to be explanatorily indispensable.
Far from being idle, normative properties as well as their corresponding nor-
mative grounding principles are necessary for imbuing non-normative features
with normative signiﬁcance and for selecting the relevant non-normative features
in the relevant circumstances.
 Conclusion
The standard reply to the supervenience argument is thus insuﬃcient for vindi-
cating non-reductive realism due to the grounding argument that functions as

its hyperintensional analogue. What makes room for a non-reductive account
of normative properties is that a normative grounding relation gives rise to these
properties which is distinct from the metaphysical grounding relation giving rise
to their disjunctive descriptive counterparts. It is thus possible to accept that the
normative is grounded in the non-normative, without ending up with a reduc-
tionist view, as long as the grounding relation is construed as involving normative
rather than metaphysical grounding. Some will take this result as yet further rea-
son to reject non-reductive versions of moral realism, whilst others will consider
the idea of irreducibly distinct normative grounding relations to be a fruitful line
of inquiry that is worthy of being pursued further. Yet, what is clear is that the
fate of non-reductive realism is inextricably tied up with there being irreducibly
diﬀerent grounding relations.
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